INDONESIA: JIHADI SURPRISE IN ACEH

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INDONESIA: JIHADI SURPRISE IN ACEH

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The discovery in late February 2010 of a jihadi training camp in Aceh came as a surprise in three ways. It revealed a major mutation in Indonesian jihadi ranks: a new coalition had emerged that rejected both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the best-known such organisation in the region, and the more violent splinter group led until his death in September 2009 by Noordin Top. It had chosen Aceh as a base, despite the antipathy of Acehnese to radical Islam. And it was led by Dulmatin, one of South East Asia’s most wanted terrorists, whom officials in both Indonesia and the Philippines believed was in Mindanao.

By mid-April police had arrested 48 coalition members, killed eight, including Dulmatin, and were looking for about fifteen others. The group’s existence and the government response show that despite enormous gains made in counter-terrorism efforts since the first Bali bombs in 2002, intelligence remains weak; monitoring of prisons and ex-prisoners remains a problem; police handling of “active shooters” needs improvement; and corruption continues to be a major lubricant for terrorist activities in Indonesia.

Dulmatin’s return to Indonesia, probably in late 2007, set in motion what became known as the lintas tanzim or cross-organisational project. Several influential jihadi leaders independently had reached the conclusion that JI had become too passive, abandoning jihad for religious outreach, and Noordin’s group had no plans beyond preparing for the next attack. One influential cleric who joined the group, Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, argued that Indonesians should follow the teachings of Jordanian radical scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and wage jihad to establish Islamic law but in a way that did not cause Muslim casualties. For both Aman and other leaders, including Dulmatin, it was critical to establish a secure base from which operations could be launched and the nucleus of an Islamic state established. The enemy should be defined not simply as anyone from the U.S. or allied countries, but as anyone who obstructed the application of Islamic law – and that meant that many Indonesian officials were high on the list.

One of Aman’s followers, through prison visits, had ties to some of Dulmatin’s closest associates – JI members who had joined Noordin, and men from another jihadi organisation called KOMPAK who had trained in Mindanao. He also had ties to Aceh, having once been stationed with the police there, and it was he who suggested that Aceh could be the secure base. Another Acehnese member of Aman’s study group recruited about twenty Acehnese, hoping they would bring in others; most were local followers of a well-known salafi cleric in Aceh Besar district. The man the jihadis wanted badly to recruit, however, was an Acehnese cleric with a proven track record of mobilising mass demonstrations in support of Islamic law and sending his students out on vigilante raids against vice. His school was a base for the Aceh branch of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), a national group that in Jakarta is known for its thuggish attacks on bars, brothels, restaurants open during Ramadan, deviant sects and “unauthorised” churches. The lintas tanzim project succeeded in recruiting some FPI members but not their leader.

In the end, Dulmatin and the others went along with the idea of setting up a secure base in Aceh, believing that since the rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) had fought the Indonesian army there for more than 30 years, it had suitable terrain; alone among Indonesian provinces, it was authorised to apply Islamic law and many community leaders were pro-sharia; and a number of hardline groups that had set up shop in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami were potential allies. In fact, community support was negligible and the coalition was doomed from the start. The experiment ended with a series of police raids in Aceh and Jakarta in February, March and April.

The failure of this initiative raises the question of where Indonesian jihadism goes next. Three streams are alive, if not particularly well. One is the JI variant, which teaches jihad, advocates military training, but says the faithful currently lack the resources to take on the enemy and therefore should focus on building up their ranks through dakwah (religious outreach). The second is the network led by the late Noordin Top focused on the use of suicide bombings to terrorise the U.S. and its allies. The third
was represented by the coalition, but also by its individual components: KOMPAK, Darul Islam, disgruntled JI members and others. Like Noordin, it was ready for jihad now, but only as the means to the end of applying Islamic law in full. If Noordin favoured bombings, the coalition members preferred targeted assassinations, as less likely to result in Muslim deaths. Further mutations and realignments will almost certainly occur; it is not impossible that the coalition’s failure will lead some to reconsider their distaste for Noordin’s tactics.

Dulmatin’s involvement in the Aceh group also underscores the possibility of cross-border jihadi cooperation. Dulmatin wanted the Aceh training camp to be a centre for mujahidin from across the region, but it remains unclear exactly what kind of cooperation he envisaged with his Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) colleagues in Mindanao.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia

1. Take immediate measures to enforce existing regulations in prisons, especially with respect to those convicted of terrorism, including by banning the use of mobile phones and otherwise restricting prisoners’ ability to have unmonitored conversations; screening printed material; and ensuring that religious study groups inside prison do not become vehicles for radicalisation of other prisoners.

2. Take immediate measures to improve methods for defining high-risk detainees, and ensure that they are better monitored while still detained and after their release. Anyone who previously worked with Noordin Top should automatically be considered high-risk. Penalties for recidivism should be increased in cases involving terrorist activity, including through making recidivists ineligible for routine sentence reductions.

3. Strictly enforce Indonesian tax laws and regulations with respect to publishers of jihadi material.

4. Appoint a special task force within the police to focus on apprehension and prosecution of document forgers, particularly forgers of passports and Indonesian identity cards (KTPs), with special attention to syndicates operating in cooperation with Indonesian immigration personnel.

5. Ensure that the new anti-terror body is led by a civilian and has the capacity to commission and use academic studies and surveys on extremist movements, including local case studies, so that policy can be based on hard data rather than unproven assumptions such as that poverty breeds radicalism.

6. Undertake internal and external assessments of police handling of “active shooter” cases where the target was killed rather than arrested; and identify training and equipment needs to increase the likelihood that high-value targets in the future can be captured alive.

7. Consider a ban on paramilitary training by non-state actors, or at least subject such training to strict regulation and control.

8. Undertake a detailed review in cooperation with Philippine counterparts of when and how Dulmatin returned, to identify security and intelligence weak points and make recommendations for their improvement.

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I. INTRODUCTION

On 22 February 2010, a local police operation based on a villager’s report of unusual activity in a forested area in north west Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, led to the discovery of a training camp in which men from virtually every known jihadi organisation in Indonesia were involved. Over the next two months, police arrested 48 and as of mid-April were still looking for fifteen others. They killed eight members of the group in raids, the most startling being Dulmatin, an Indonesian terrorist wanted around the world who law enforcement officials from Jakarta to Washington thought was in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. The almost daily revelations from the police suggested that a major mutation had occurred in Indonesian jihadism: a new group had emerged that rejected both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the best-known and largest jihadi organisation in the region, and the more violent splinter group led by Noordin Top until his death in September 2009.

Former rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) were not involved in any significant way; even the few who claimed to be GAM had played only a tangential role during the conflict. Instead, the training camp in Aceh represented the coming together of mujahidin from a number of different groups in Java and Sumatra who believed that a more coherent strategy for jihad in Indonesia was needed. They were scathingly critical of the JI leadership for abandoning jihad in favour of religious outreach and education, but they also believed that Noordin Top, responsible for a series of dramatic suicide bombings between 2003 and 2009, lacked a long-term vision. Jihad should be a means to an end, not the end itself. In their view, Noordin, while a courageous fighter, never thought beyond the next attack and lost so many people in the process that he had to start from scratch for every subsequent operation.

The catalyst was Dulmatin, who returned to Indonesia in late 2007, and a small circle of friends interested in developing a new program that could unite the jihadi community. But long before he returned, discontent in jihadi ranks was already apparent. By 2006-2007, several influential figures had come to the conclusion – independently and from different vantage points – that a new approach was needed.

The most important was Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman or simply Ustad (“Teacher”) Aman, an influential salafi scholar and Arabic linguist who was Indonesia’s foremost translator of the writings of Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Al-Maqdisi had been the mentor of the Iraq-based jihadi leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but broke with him in 2004. He termed Zarqawi’s method of war _qital nikayah_ or war simply to weaken the enemy through repeated attacks, and suggested it be replaced by _qital tamkin_ or war to establish Islamic law. The first, particularly when waged among majority Muslim populations, brought suffering to the community and often legitimised the enemy’s retaliation. _Qital tamkin_ could be more effective, as it would achieve a long-term strategic goal. Another figure who contributed to this thinking was Oman Rochman’s student Anwar Cheplu, who rallied many of the ḥajjahs (Islamic scholars) in the region to push for a more coherent and strategic approach to jihad.

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*Tamkin,* by contrast, could lay the basis for an Islamic state, but it had to be preceded by the establishment of a secure base from which to operate and an organisation that could control the base, apply Islamic law and serve as a proto-government. The base had to be set up in an area with the potential for both strong community support and guerrilla warfare against the enemy as needed. For *qital tamkin,* al-Maqdisi argued, *dakwah* (religious outreach) and jihad had to go hand in hand.

Aman translated al-Maqdisi’s critique of Zarqawi around 2006 while he was serving a sentence in Bandung on terrorism charges. It was published in 2007 by a leading JI publisher with the title *Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah (They Are Mujahidin But They Made Mistakes),* and became the focus of intense debate in jihadi circles—in part because the implicit target of the criticism was Noordin. Noordin was an avid admirer of Zarqawi and would have liked nothing better than to follow his model of repeated assaults:

> Faced with this tactic, the enemy has no time to consolidate his forces, because they have to concentrate on evacuating the dead, the wounded, the stressed, the victims with mental breakdowns. They have no chance to reorient their battle tactics. There is just fear, fear, and despair of fighting the mujahidin.

Aman argued that the focus rather should be on replacing democracy with a state governed by Islamic law. The real enemies were not foreign tourists but officials who refused to apply sharia. He also argued that there was no point in taking on the enemy from a position of weakness; the mujahidin had to build their military capacity.

A group associated with Abdullah Sunata in KOMPAK had reached the same conclusion as early as 2004 when Sunata himself declined to join Noordin in the Australian embassy bombing. Sunata saw Ambon and Poso as legitimate jihads against a local enemy while Noordin’s bombings were not. By 2007 KOMPAK was also talking in terms of *qital tamkin* and saw Poso as a good model of a secure base, where from 2001 to late 2006, KOMPAK and JI, together or separately, had carried out operations against local targets without the police ever realising who was responsible. From sometime in 2007, Sunata and Aman were in regular communication from their respective prison cells.

Both men developed and disseminated their ideas in prison, Sunata through his many visitors and prison-based discussion groups, Aman through his prolific writings. These were published as fast as he could produce them by JI publishers but also distributed via photocopies and electronically. Aman’s surreptitiously recorded lectures were also distributed widely on cassettes and over the internet.

In the midst of this debate Joko Pitono alias Dulmatin returned to Indonesia from Mindanao with the idea of uniting the various jihadi groups for more effective jihad. He himself had often crossed organisational lines. Inducted as a JI member, he fled to Mindanao after the Bali bombings with the help of KOMPAK and ended up fighting in a unit that included JI, KOMPAK, Darul Islam and several Moro organisations. His closest contacts in Indonesia were a few Mindanao alumni from JI and KOMPAK and a few JI men who had been part of Noordin’s inner circle but after being arrested, imprisoned and released now had serious reservations about his operations.

It was Dulmatin and his friends who broached the idea of a new program they called *lintas tanzim* or “across organisations”. This broad coalition would focus more strategically on the endgame, but through military preparation and control of territory that would serve as a secure base for mujahidin from all over South East Asia. It would draw on the expertise and support networks of all the different groups and eventually become more than the sum of its constituent parts. Building on lessons learned from Poso and Mindanao, analysis of the flaws in Noordin’s bombing program, and personal ties forged in earlier conflicts, in prisons and through marriages and kinship, it would lay the foundation for a broader-based struggle than anything attempted thus far.

Dulmatin’s leadership brought the various strands together and provided the inspiration for a new movement based on the concept of *qital tamkin.* In jihadi circles, Dulmatin

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4 Aman was arrested in March 2004 for arranging a bombing class for his followers in Cimanggis, Depok, outside Jakarta. He was sentenced to seven years but with remissions (routine sentence reductions), he was released in July 2008.

5 Abdul Barr al-Harby (pseudonym), “Maka, Pergilah Kamu Bersama Rabbmu!!”, *ishoomy.blogspot.com* (unpaginated, undated, but apparently written by one of Noordin’s followers sometime in August or early September 2009). The author claims with evident admiration that Zarqawi mounted 800 attacks in three years, and that each attack brought in new recruits. The document is a tirade against Jemaah Islamiyah for its preoccupation with organisation and structure instead of jihad, and a point-by-point refutation of the arguments JI uses for not engaging in attacks. Abu Rusdan, the former JI amir, is criticised by name for appearing on television after the July 2009 hotel bombings to condemn the attacks.

6 Crisis Group interview, former prisoner, Jakarta, March 2010.

7 Sunata was arrested in June 2005 for, among other things, providing Noordin with a pistol before the 2004 embassy bombing. He was sentenced to seven years and released in March 2009.
was famous. He was one of the original Bali bombers. He had a $10 million bounty on his head through the U.S. “Rewards for Justice” program. His death had been announced so many times by the Philippines armed forces that his stature in the jihadi community had soared. He had direct combat experience from 2003-2005 first with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), then after with the Abu Sayyaf Group. He had strong religious credentials, having once taught at JI’s Lukmanul Hakiem school in Johor, Malaysia, the nerve centre of JI from the early 1990s until 2001, when the Malaysian government shut it down. Ustad Aman had provided the ideological framework; with Dulmatin back in Indonesia, the work of making it a reality could begin.

This report is based on extensive interviews in Jakarta and Aceh as well as published media interviews with a few of those arrested. The chronology presented here should be considered preliminary, however, with some changes required as more information becomes available.

II. BRINGING JIHADIS TOGETHER

The most important components of the Aceh group were Dulmatin’s former JI and KOMPAK contacts; two factions of Darul Islam, including one called Ring Banten that had worked with Noordin on the Australian embassy bombing; the group around Ustad Aman; and a newly recruited group of men from Aceh.

A. DULMATIN

Much remains murky about Dulmatin’s movements before and after he returned to Indonesia – indeed it is unclear when he first came back and whether he made any roundtrips to the Philippines thereafter. Deteriorating conditions in Jolo, Mindanao, however, seem to have been a major push factor in his leaving.

Dulmatin had fled to Mindanao in April 2003 with the help of KOMPAK. Instead of joining fellow JI members in JI’s regional subdivision (wakalah) in Mindanao, he first joined an MILF elite force together with fellow fugitive Umar Patek; Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir; and men from KOMPAK and Darul Islam. They were later joined by Dulmatin’s brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro alias Bahar. In November 2005, the MILF leadership expelled them from mainland Mindanao in the interests of peace negotiations with the Philippines government, so Dulmatin, Umar Patek and Hari Kuncoro and the men around them, with deep bitterness towards most of their former allies, joined the Abu Sayyaf Group, but maintained contact with some individual MILF commanders. Conditions had been bad enough in MILF territory, but they were reportedly worse in Jolo and continued to deteriorate as Philippine military operations, with support from U.S. forces, intensified.

9 Umar Patek, like Dulmatin, was a JI member who took part in the 2002 Bali bombings and fled to Mindanao in 2003. He is married to a Filipina convert to Islam. Zulkifli bin Hir was a member of the JI affiliate Kelompok Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM); he is more commonly known as Marwan.

10 One MILF commander willing to help was Mugosid alias Abu Badrin, who had been with Umar Patek in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. But Abu Badrin himself was under pressure from the MILF so his ability to protect them was limited, and in any case, he was arrested in January 2009. In addition, Dulmatin never felt safe because there were too many informers. He remembered well what had happened to Fathurrahman Al Ghozi, a JI member responsible for numerous attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines including the 30 December 2000 bombing of the Manila Light Rail Transit line. Al Ghozi was arrested and sentenced to seventeen years in prison. He escaped in July 2003 and was tracked down and killed in Mindanao in October 2003, reportedly betrayed by a senior MILF member.

The plan to go home had been discussed since 2006. As a first step, Dulmatin planned to send his family back but before he could do so, his wife and children were arrested in a raid in October 2006. Undeterred, he reportedly reached Indonesia after several attempts at the end of 2007, together with two close friends. One was Niko alias Jundi alias Ridwan, who had been Dulmatin’s private bodyguard since he went to Mindanao in 2003. Originally from Cibubur, West Java, he had been a KOMPAK activist who had fought in Poso with the local KOMPAK affiliate, Mujahadin Kayamanya. Dulmatin took Ridwan’s sister as his second wife shortly after he returned to Indonesia. Niko married into the extended family of the Ring Banten leadership. The other man who returned with Dulmatin was a Philippine national, reportedly a member of Abu Sayyaf, named Hasan Noor.

Shortly after his return, Dulmatin applied for and received an Indonesian passport in the name of Yahya Ibrahim from the east Jakarta immigration office. It remains unclear whether he used it to leave the country or whether he stayed in Indonesia until his death in a police raid on 9 March 2010. From the moment he returned, however, he was in touch with a group of JI released prisoners, all of whom had been close to Noordin before. Three were former classmates who had been arrested for helping Noordin before the 2004 Australian embassy bombing.11 Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubaid was one of JI’s intellectuals and a prolific translator of al-Qaeda texts; Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah had helped introduce Noordin to Ring Banten. Both were released in March 2007. Deny Suramto, the third friend, was released five months earlier. Having suffered the consequences of Noordin’s strategic shortcomings, all were interested in Dulmatin’s idea for a new jihadi initiative that involved setting up a base that would serve as a training camp for the whole region.

These initial discussions included at least one other critical figure: Qomaruddin bin Zaimun alias Mustaqim alias Abu Yusuf. A JI member, now in his late thirties, he had overlapped with Dulmatin at the Lukman al-Hakiem school in Johore, Malaysia. He joined the first class in JI’s new military academy in the Philippines in 1998 and stayed in Mindanao until early 2004, briefly taking over leadership of the JI regional division there in December 2003.12 He thus would still have been there when Dulmatin arrived in April 2003. In June 2004, Mustaqim was arrested in Sukoharjo, Central Java, with five others. One escaped and four were later convicted of withholding information on Noordin Top.13 Mustaqim was allowed to go free, according to one source at the scene, apparently because he recently had been in a motorcycle accident and the police felt sorry for him.14

By early 2008, outreach to other groups was well underway. Urwah and Ubaid were regularly visiting their friends in prison and discussing the new project, and a KOMPAK man, Sibgho alias Mus’ab, was also helping with outreach, especially to pesantren. A native of Magetan, graduate of al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan that was run by the family of Bali bombers Muchlas, Amrozi and Ali Imron, Sibgho was a respected religious scholar and a veteran of the Ambon and Poso conflicts with extensive networks from both. He also had the added advantage of never having been imprisoned or included on any wanted list.

B. Ring Banten

From the beginning, Dulmatin’s discussions had included Ring Banten. The group, founded and led by a man known as Kang Jaja, and based in Pandeglang, Banten, west of Jakarta, had broken away from the larger Darul Islam organisation in 2000. It had cooperated with JI on the first Bali bombing, sent men to fight in Poso, and worked with Noordin on the Australian embassy attack. Together with his Mindanao-trained brother Saptono, and his nephew-by-marriage Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, who is on death row for the embassy bombing, Kang Jaja apparently became involved in the lintas tanzim project at an early stage. Family ties may have helped bring them in: Deny Suramto, Ubaid and Urwah’s friend, is Rois’s brother-in-law.

Kang Jaja had reportedly been on a wanted list since 2001, but police never made a serious effort to track him down, apparently in part because they were not sure they had enough evidence to convict him in court. He had been personally involved in training his members before the Australian embassy bombing. Afterwards, he fled to Poso where he was protected by local JI members. He even-

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11 They were all alumni of a school called Mahad Aly in Gad-ing, Solo, Central Java. Between about 1995 and 2004, it served as de facto headquarters for JI-Solo.
12 The division, called wakalah Hudaibiyah, was headed by Ahmad Faisal alias Zulkifli alias Dany Ofresio, but Zulkifli was arrested in December 2003 in Sabah, while returning to Indonesia from Mindanao. He was subsequently returned to the Philippines where he was wanted for various acts of terrorism.
13 The others were Sunarto bin Kartodiharjo alias Adung, former acting amir of JI, sentenced to seven years in April 2005 and released in March 2009; Usman bin Seif alias Fahim, sentenced to three years in April 2005 and released in November 2006; Sabturani, a Malaysian, sentenced to four years in April 2005 and released in August 2007 after which he returned to Malaysia; Rahmat Pujiprabowo alias Bejo, sentenced to three years in February 2004 and released in October 2006, then arrested in October 2009 for helping hide Noordin after the July hotel bombings; and Qotadah who reportedly escaped, although there are persistent reports of his death.
tually made his way back to West Java, where either he was never detected or the police simply stopped looking for him. Rois had also managed to recruit several additional men from prison, including Ismet Hakiki.

Ismet Hakiki was one of the first of the group arrested by police in Aceh in February 2010; Kang Jaja was eventually killed trying to flee from Aceh on 12 March 2010.

C. AMAN ABDURRAHMAN

The group around Aman Abdurrahman seems to have never developed a real organisational or membership structure, but was nevertheless a cohesive network that endured and even expanded during his imprisonment. In 2004, before his arrest, members called themselves al-Muwahidun; by the time Aman was in prison, his translations were circulating in the name of Jamaah Taudhid wal Jihad. He seems to have kept his study groups (pengajian) going using cassettes and CDs of his talks. One man who was arrested at the same time as Aman but released earlier, Kamaludin bin Khasan, better known as Ustad Kamal, ran the study sessions until Aman was out.15

While still in Sukamiskin Prison, Bandung, Aman developed a new following among other inmates. They included a group of men from an academy run by the home affairs ministry for future local government administrators (Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, IPDN) who had been arrested for the hazing death of a fellow student. Some may have already had ultra-puritan persuasions as IPDN has an active salafi community, but a prison warden asserted that several were radicalised after contact with Aman, to the point that they regarded working for the government as anathema. When prison authorities discovered Aman’s influence over this group, he was transferred out of Sukamiskin in 2007, not long before his release.16 One of the released IPDN prisoners, Gema Awal Ramadhan, ended up in the lintas tanzim project.

After his July 2008 release, which was announced with great fanfare on jihadi blogs and websites, Aman became an instant hit on the hardline dakwah circuit.17 An al-Maqdisi tract on why democracy was antithetical to Islam, published in Indonesian in late 2007 as Agama/Demokraci [Religion/Democracy], became the basis for many of his lectures, particularly as the 2009 elections drew closer.18 He was already well known through dissemination of his lectures via cassettes, but he now developed a large following not only in the West Java-Jakarta area but as far away as East Kalimantan and Lombok. By mid-2009 he had set up a pesantren called Millah Ibrahim in Pamulang, a suburb of Jakarta where Dulfadlin was eventually tracked down and killed. Sometime thereafter, he either set up a second school or moved the first to Depok, also just outside Jakarta, under the name of Pesantren Ibn Masoed.

In jihadi circles, Aman was one of three clerics seen as the best salafi scholars in Indonesia.19 By 2008, there was a general sense that the jihadi movement had much collective military expertise but lacked religious depth; Aman could help provide it. A faction of Darul Islam, called DI-Akram after its leader, sent its cadres to study with him, and other groups did the same.20 He also attracted many followers disillusioned with the lack of militancy in other Islamic organisations.

In September 2008, two months after his release, Aman joined the new organisation set up by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir called Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), as did Ubaid, and Halawi Makmun, a radical preacher from Bogor.21 Ubaid’s presence suggests that some of those who joined initially might have seen JAT as the vehicle for lintas tanzim. But a dispute with the Ba’asyir family over doctrine caused Aman to quit the group by early 2009.22

15 Kamaludin (Kamal), born 1981, from Majalengka, was arrested in March 2004, although he never made it to the Cimanggis bomb-making class. He was sentenced to three years in prison after appealing a heavier sentence to the Supreme Court; he would likely have been released in late 2006. He had been a student at the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in Jakarta and had joined Aman in 2002, when the latter was affiliated to a salafi institution known as Yayasan al-Sofwa. He told police interrogators that his ambition was to join the Taliban in Afghanistan. See testimony of Kamaludin bin Khasan, 6 April and 9 June 2004, in case dossier of Oman Rochman, No.Pol. BP/265/V/2004/DitReskrim.


17 For example see “Ust Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman Telah Bebas”, millahibrahim.wordpress.com, 4 July 2008.


19 The other two were JI’s Farid Okbeh, based in Jakarta, and Halawi Makmun, based in nearby Bogor.


21 Halawi had been head of the sharia department of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), an above ground group founded in 2000 to work for the application of Islamic law, headed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir but as far away as East Kalimantan and Lombok. In 2008, Ba’asyir left MMI in a dispute over the leadership structure and founded a new organisation, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). Halawi also left MMI to join him in the new group.

22 According to one source, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and his son Abdul Rahim thought that Aman was too hardline, too quick
D. YUDI AND SOFYAN

Two of Aman’s admirers, Yudi Zulfahri, from Keutapang, Aceh Besar, and a former policeman named Moh. Sofyan Tsauri provided the links to Aceh – and the misperceptions about its suitability as a base. Yudi in 2005-2006 was a student at the same home affairs academy, IPDN, whose members joined Aman in prison.23 He fell in with a radical group the year before he graduated and after returning to Aceh, he decided he did not want to work for a government he considered un-Islamic.24 He joined a salafi study group led by Tgk. Nur Adami, better known as Abu Nur, a prominent cleric in Aceh Besar who was close to the Makassar-based organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah.25 Abu Nur sent Yudi and another member of the study group, Agam Fitriadi bin Darwin, to a Wahdah school in Makassar for a short preparatory course in Arabic in the second half of 2007. Instead of returning immediately to Aceh after the course, Yudi found a job in south Jakarta selling Islamic books in a neighbourhood where Aman used to preach. His distributor introduced him to Sofyan, an ex-policeman who had an extensive collection of materials on jihad.

Born in Cirebon, West Java, Sofyan was seen as a religious teacher. He had studied at Pesantren Lirboyo, a famous school in Kediri, East Java, associated with the moderate Muslim organisation Nahdatul Ulama.26 By the time PK had renamed itself the movement (a religio-political organisation modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood) but he eventually grew more radical.26 By the time PK had renamed itself the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) prior to the 2004 election, Sofyan had grown disillusioned with the pragmatic stance of the PKS leadership, and he began looking for another ideological home.

He was attracted to salafi jihadism after reading some of the JI-published books. He also became an avid collector of photocopies and cassettes of Aman’s lectures which were in wide circulation in and around Depok. Sofyan was eventually introduced to Aman and to jihadi figures in prison such as Urwah, Ubad and Abdullah Sunata. He became a frequent visitor to the jihadi detained in Cipinang Prison, and considered himself Urwah’s student. The two became closer after Urwah’s release in April 2007. Sofyan’s ties to the Cipinang crowd means that he was almost certainly brought into the lintas tanzim discussions at a fairly early stage.

Yudi and Sofyan bonded not only through their interest in jihadi literature but also through their Aceh connection. Before the December 2004 tsunami, Sofyan had been posted there with the police as a community outreach officer; he also served as a preacher. After the tsunami he returned as a volunteer with Bulan Sabit Merah (Red Crescent Society, no link to the international federation) and at some stage married a second wife from Aceh.

When Sofyan returned to Jakarta, he opened and ran a company for recreational shooting called Depok Air Softer while serving as an active duty officer assigned to the local police station in Depok from sometime in 2005 to 2007.27 After Sofyan and Yudi became friends in late 2007, Yudi went to work for the company, which advertised its air pistols and rifles in jihadi magazines; Abdullah Sunata also began to work there after his release in 2009 and reportedly invested Rp.10 million (about $1,000) in the company.

Yudi became an active member of Aman’s study group under Ustad Kamal (Sofyan wanted to join but was rejected because of his ties to the police).25 In March 2008, Yudi says he returned to Aceh at Ustad Kamal’s urging, with the intention of building a community through dakwah that shared his interest in jihad against thaghut or un-Islamic government. When he visited Abu Nur, his former teacher was shocked at how militant he had become.29

Toward the end of fasting month in October 2008, Sofyan visited Aceh to celebrate Idul Fitri with his wife’s family. Yudi introduced him to his friends and they discussed the need for training. Sofyan then said he would

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25 This is one reason for believing that the institute already might have had a radical cell before the hazers found themselves with Aman in prison.
23 In the 1990s, Abu Nur, a former GAM member, was an activist in the tarbiyah movement (a religio-political organisation modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood) but he eventually fell out with Abu Ridho, one of the movement’s founders, and moved closer to salafi teachings. He now runs an Islamic boarding school called Darul Maryam in Samahani, Aceh Besar, funded by donors from Qatar. Tgk. is an abbreviation for the Acehnese honorific Teungku, denoting someone with religious knowledge.
22 He reportedly studied under Ustad Suparyono, a member of the Depok district council from PK.
27 Sofyan’s activities during this period are not completely clear. Unconfirmed information suggests he may have been detained briefly in Cipinang Prison during this period which if true, would certainly have facilitated his contacts with the jihadi prisoners.
29 Crisis Group interview, Aceh Besar, 4 April 2010.
contact his friends in Java.\textsuperscript{30} He returned to Depok and met with others involved in the lintas tanzim project.\textsuperscript{31}

Not long afterwards, Ustad Kamal and Halawi Makmun visited Aceh at Yudi’s invitation, and Yudi took them to see Abu Nur. They discussed the need for jihad and asked Abu Nur to join them, but he refused. The meeting ended acrimoniously, with the visitors accusing Abu Nur of verging on idolatry.\textsuperscript{32} Yudi then organised a training session (dauroh) with Kamal and Halawi as instructors and urged Abu Nur’s followers to take part. Afterwards, Abu Nur found that participation in his study group was rapidly shrinking as the members joined Yudi.\textsuperscript{33} One of those members was Tgk. Ahmad alias Andre.

Andre became an enthusiastic proponent of jihad and, through Yudi, was introduced to Sofyan. In late 2008, he joined Sibgho, the KOMPAK go-between; Yudi; a Tunisian named Ali Arafah, who introduced himself as a salafi shaikh; and Dulmatin (who was then calling himself Tgk. Hamzah) in a courtesy call on Tgk. Muslim Attahiri at Pesantren Darul Mujahidin in Lhokseumawe.\textsuperscript{34} Tgk. Muslim was known for his militant pro-sharia stance and frequently encouraged his students to carry out vigilante raids against violators of local sharia regulations. He exemplified the kind of local leader that the lintas tanzim leaders were interested in recruiting in Aceh and that they believed would be critical to building community support. But Tgk. Muslim was not particularly taken with his visitors, who suggested that many traditional practices in Aceh were unwarranted innovations (bid’ah) and should be forbidden under Islamic law. At this stage, no one broached the subject of training.\textsuperscript{35}

E. ACEH AS THE SECURE BASE

By this point, the main outlines of the lintas tanzim program were taking shape. The agenda was applying sharia Islam through jihad. The key steps toward that agenda were:

- development of a secure base that could become a place of refuge as well as a base for operations;
- military training, the backbone of the movement, so that those trained would have the capacity to guard the secure base from enemy attacks; and
- dakwah, focused on the area within the secure base, to increase community support.

Attacks would only take place within the base area on thaght – civilian officials and security forces who were seen as obstacles to the application of Islamic law – and those, including Western civilians, who were spreading secular thought. Noordin-style infijar (bombings) would be replaced by ightiyalat (assassinations), to reduce the controversy generated by deaths of Muslims and increase recruitment possibilities.

Sofyan reportedly pressed for Aceh as the base area, citing three reasons. As GAM had shown, it was an ideal location for guerrilla struggle, because it was hilly and forested. GAM had survived there for years without ever being defeated by the Indonesian military. Second, Aceh was permitted by law to apply sharia and there were religious leaders committed to its expansion, so it should be easier to build an Islamic community. Third, a number of pro-sharia groups had taken root in Aceh after the tsunami. These included the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) some of whose most active members were based at Tgk. Muslim Attahiri’s pesantren, Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin In-

\textsuperscript{30}“Wawancara Tersangka Terorisme”, Kompas, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{31}The chronology here is reconstructed from interviews and press accounts, but as more details come in from court documents it may need revision.
\textsuperscript{32}Crisis Group interview, Aceh Besar, 4 April 2010. At issue among other things was the Acehnese practice of peusijeuk, sprinkling water as a blessing on a newly arrived guest or on someone undertaking a new task. Peusijeuk in Acehnese tradition can only be bestowed by a respected elder or religious leader.
\textsuperscript{33}Crisis Group interview, Aceh Besar, 4 April 2010. In addition to Yudi, Abu Nur’s former students who joined the new extremist group included Muhammad Marzuki, from Alue Bu, Peureulak, East Aceh, shot by police on 4 March 2010; Surya Achda alias Abu Semak Belukar, from Desa Sare, Selulim, Aceh Besar, a chemical technology graduate of Brawijaya University, Malang, East Java in 2000, arrested 25 February 2010; Masykur Rahmat, arrested 23 February 2010; Nukman (Nu’man), now on the police wanted list, and his brother, Zulfadli, who was designated as amir for Aceh; and Tgk. Ahmad alias Andre, arrested 9 March 2010.
\textsuperscript{34}Crisis Group interview, North Aceh, 3 March 2010. It was Dulmatin’s first visit to Aceh and he kept silent, perhaps so no one would realise he was Javanese. For reference to Ali Arafah, see “Polri Jangan Gegabah Soal Pembocor Senjata”, Kompas, 14 April 2010. He was apparently working for a Qatar-funded NGO in Aceh, and if it is true that he was Tunisian, it would be the second recent instance of Indonesian-North African jihadi collaboration. The first was in early 2008, when a man known as Jafar the Algerian helped purchase tickets from Malaysia to Syria on Qatar Airways for two senior JI members, Abu Husna and Dr Agus. Both were arrested in Kuala Lumpur before they could leave.

\textsuperscript{35}“Wawancara Tersangka Terorisme”, Kompas, op. cit. and Crisis Group interview, North Aceh, 3 March 2010. Despite his militancy, Tgk. Muslim was a firm adherent of the Syafi’i madzhab (school of law) and did not agree with the ultrapuritanism of salafi clerics.
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Indonesia, MMI) and Wahdah Islamiyah, a Makassar-based salafi organisation, among others.36

Sofyan also reportedly argued that some GAM splinters were pro-sharia like Pasukan Peudang based in Sawang, North Aceh. After his arrest, Yudi acknowledged to a reporter that he and Sofyan had discussions in late 2008 with Abdul Razak, a former GAM leader who “still wanted to fight”. In general, however, GAM splinter groups were a poor source of recruits.37

Dulmatin and those around him likely would have accepted Yudi and Sofyan’s conviction that they could get local support; they would not have had many alternative sources of information. Very few Acehnese joined JI, and the network of JI contacts in Aceh was mostly among transplanted Javanese and Sundanese. KOMPAK and Darul Islam attracted some Acehnese to fight in Ambon and Poso at the height of the conflicts there, and a number of their members went to Aceh after the tsunami to help with disaster relief.38 One or two Acehnese ended up in Mindanao for training, and a few Acehnese drug dealers in Bali, Medan and Jakarta were radicalised in prison by jihadi detainees.39 But anyone who had spent time in Aceh would have known that it was not very susceptible to radical jihadi thought, given strong Acehnese nationalism; its conflict-weary population had no interest in jihad; and most Acehnese were appreciative of international political and economic support for the peace process and therefore resisted anti-Western preaching.

Nevertheless, Aceh by late 2008 had been accepted in principle as the site for the secure base.

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36 Wahdah Islamiyah was closely associated with the Makassar-based militia, Laskar Jundullah, which was active in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. It opened an Aceh office after the tsunami. MMI opened an office in Aceh in 2005, and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia also began systematic recruiting after the tsunami. The latter would have had little interest in any salafi jihadi initiative, however, as it eschews violence and maintains that jihad must await the re-establishment of a caliphate.

37 “Wawancara Tersangka Terorisme”, Kompas, op. cit. Abdul Razak, now serving a short prison sentence in Jakarta for a series of crimes including some of the pre-election violence against the GAM-affiliated Partai Aceh, had known connections with military and intelligence personnel, as well as indirect ties to the Sawang, North Aceh-based GAM splinter group called Pasukan Peudang. He was arrested by provincial police in March 2009, was tried in November-December 2009 and given a sentence of two years, eight months. As of March 2010 he was in Salemba Detention Centre, Jakarta. One source suggested that Sofyan sold arms to Abdul Razak through Muchtar Ibrahim but Crisis Group could not confirm the information.

38 For example, Rusli Mardani alias Uci from KOMPAK and Mujahidin Kayamanya went to Aceh for a month after the tsunami. He also fled there after the Loki attack in May 2005 in West Ceram, Maluku, and stayed with a man named Wahyudin who had been with him in the Ambon fighting. Case dossier of Rusli Mardani alias Uci, op. cit.

39 A man from Aceh named Muntohar was a member of War Training Course (Kuliyah Harbiyah Dauroh, KHD)-II the second class in JI’s military academy at Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao that began in early 2000.
III. PLANS FOR ACEH

The visit from Dulmatin and others in late 2008 to the Darul Mujahidin pesantren had one immediate outcome: a close friendship between Andre, who accompanied the group, and one of Tgk. Muslim’s students who was present, Muchtar Ibrahim. Muchtar had served a short sentence in Cipinang Prison some years earlier for marijuana dealing. Indonesian newspapers reported that he was a former GAM member, but at best he was a sympathetic, not a fighter. From the moment he entered the pesantren in early 2008, he became known for his advocacy of jihad and his admiration of Abdullah Azzam, one of the main theoreticians of salafi jihadism. His enthusiasm reportedly increased after taking part in a dauroh with Dulmatin in Banda Aceh that apparently took place just after the latter’s visit to Tgk. Muslim. When it was over, Muchtar joined Yudi’s group.

A. MILITARY TRAINING

Not long afterwards, in January 2009, FPI-Aceh, based at Attahirri’s school, announced in the press a recruitment drive for volunteers to go to Gaza and help in the war against Israel. Andre, from Yudi’s group, went to Tgk. Muslim at Darul Mujahidin, and suggested that Sofyan be invited as the trainer, saying (untruthfully) that Sofyan had trained in Mindanao. Tgk. Muslim agreed, and Sofyan became the sole trainer of some 70 young men selected from among 400 who signed up.

An initial four-day training took place from 23-26 January in and around Darul Mujahidin, with Sofyan teaching the recruits about warfare tactics, using sticks instead of real guns. Yudi, Andre and Dulmatin observed the training, with Yudi documenting it with a video camera; local police and military watched as well.

From the 70 who took part, an initial fifteen were selected to be sent to Gaza after some further training in Jakarta, with Muchtar and three others accompanying them.

On 5 February 2009 the group left for Jakarta. After a week of instruction from FPI luminaries at a pesantren in Bogor, the plans for Gaza were cancelled, ostensibly because the political situation there had improved. A few of the men went home, but Sofyan invited the others to stay on for additional military training in Depok. Those who joined included five men later arrested or sought by police in Aceh for involvement in the Dulmatin-led group. Muchtar did not take part – he returned to Aceh reportedly to await the arrival of some weapons from Batam.

The course took place from February to April in a house in Depok, not far from the headquarters of Brimob, the paramilitary police. Military training was led by Sofyan and a Brimob trooper named Muhammad Toat who was a student of Aman Abdurrahman. Religious training was provided by Sibgho and, as soon as he was released from prison, Abdullah Sumata, who also taught operational tactics for jihad operations, including kid-napping. Mornings were taken up with physical fitness training, running and self-defence courses. After lunch there was instruction in the basis in Islamic law for jihad. Afternoons focused on weapons training, including videos on military training that had been prepared by Sofyan. Evenings were reserved for discussions on religion, with the trainees often asked to report back to the group on books they had read by writers such as Azzam.

40 Abdullah Azzam was a Palestinian scholar and cleric who became a mentor to Osama bin Laden and helped recruit foreign fighters for the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He was murdered in Peshawar, Pakistan in November 1989. His writings were translated and published in Indonesian in 2001 as a twelve-volume set called Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education). Several of his treatises and lectures have been separately translated and published by jihadi publishers, most of them linked to JI.

41 This took place only months before nationwide parliamentary elections, scheduled for April 2009, in which Aceh for the first time fielded local parties. Partai Aceh, affiliated with GAM, was expected to do particularly well. At the time, there was concern in Aceh that the recruits, who included a few former GAM members, were being prepared by the security forces as a pre-election anti-GAM militia under the guise of military training for Palestine. These allegations were never substantiated.

42 According to FPI-Aceh leader Yusuf Qhardhawi, 125 were selected but some dropped out along the way.


45 It is unlikely that plans to get the recruits to Gaza had been seriously thought through. Periodic recruitment drives for Palestine in Indonesia rarely result in anyone actually reaching the Middle East.

46 These were Taufik alias Abu Sayyaf alias Alex (from Pidie); Azwani alias Abu Matang alias Abu Mus’ab (Bireuen); Azwar alias Abu Recong (East Aceh); Munir alias Abu Rimba alias Abu Uteun (Aceh Besar) and Muhsin alias Imam Muda alias Abu Ipon alias Aconk (Pidie). Two others who took part, Mukhlis from East Aceh and Mukhlis were arrested for illegal possession of weapons in April 2009 when returning to Aceh; Mukhlis later rejoined the lintas tanzim group.


48 According to one participant, Sunata taught them how to cover the traces of mobile telephone conversations; how to choose locations for ransom money drop-offs; how to have the money picked up by motorcycle taxi drivers; and so on. Crisis Group interview, Banda Aceh, 3 April 2010.
One participant said that the name Tanzim al-Qaeda Indonesia for Serambi Makkah had already come up as a possible name for the group that was beginning to take shape, with those present becoming the regional commanders (panglima wilayah), apparently following the GAM structure. There were discussions about attacks on officials who did not implement sharia, with Governor Irwandi and a few district heads mentioned by name, although the discussions did not translate into serious planning. Using Aceh as a base from which sharia would spread to the rest of Indonesia, and as a training centre for the rest of South East Asia also came up.

The trainees were taught about raising funds through armed robberies of non-Muslims (fa’i). The group planned to undertake a few practice robberies in the Depok area and surveyed a gold store and a supermarket, but when the designated robbers got cold feet, the plans were cancelled. While they were planning their first operation, however, word came from Banda Aceh that Yudi’s group had attempted an attack, with two members throwing a smoke grenade into the UNICEF office in March 2009. It was harmless, but it was the first operation of jihadis in Aceh.

By April only six of the original group were left. Three of the men left because of the focus on salafi teachings and rejection of traditional Acehnese practices, as well as the constant criticism of FPI as being a creation of thaghut generals. The others all joined the group around Yudi and continued training in Tasikmalaya. Sofyan also arranged shooting instruction and target practice in the Brimob headquarters before they returned to Aceh.

B. THE EFFORT TO WOO TGK. MUSLIM ATTAHIRI

The lintas tanzim group badly wanted Tgk. Muslim from Darul Mujahidin on board. They needed local leaders, and Tgk. Muslim, with his FPI network, had a proven ability to mobilise large groups for anti-vice operations. In the view of Dulmatin, Sofyan and others, those operations were a form of jihad, and the motto of Darul Mujahidin was one that every jihadi knew: Live purely or die as a martyr (hidup secara mulya atau mati secara syahid). He also shared the goal of full implementation of Islamic law. Having successfully recruited other FPI members, the group set out to win him over.

In April Yudi and a friend went to meet him at a mosque in Banda Aceh. They invited Tgk. Muslim to join forces to wage jihad for the establishment of sharia. But Tgk. Muslim refused, on the grounds that jihad needed a fatwa from the other ulama in Aceh. Yudi argued that jihad was an individual obligation for all Muslims and so did not need a fatwa. Tgk. Muslim saw this as indicating lack of respect for ulama, and the meeting ended.

Around May 2009, the group tried again, this time with Yudi and Sofyan bringing two of the group’s heavy-weights, Abdullah Sunata from KOMPAK and Ahmad Sayid Maulana from Darul Islam (DI-Akram), to persuade Tgk. Muslim to join. They told him they planned to open a training camp in Aceh. Tgk. Muslim said the military preparation (i’dad) was fine as long no real weapons were used, but he rejected the idea of a training camp without a fatwa on jihad. Several further attempts to persuade him also failed.

C. SETTING UP THE CAMP

Sunata and Maulana used their visit to check out a possible training site that Yudi had identified in Payabakung, North Aceh. Sunata had run training camps in Ambon and Poso during the conflicts there. He had also run the infamous course in West Ceram in July 2004 where posters of then presidential candidate Yudhoyono and his running mate Yusuf Kalla were used as target practice. Sunata took one look at the North Aceh site and rejected it for being too close to a residential area. Yudi then asked Abu Rimba, one of the trainees at Sofyan’s camp in Depok, to help find an alternative location; he led them to Jantho, Aceh Besar.

The team returned to Jakarta, and held regular meetings in a mosque near the bus terminal in Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta, with Dulmatin, Sunata, Mustaqim and sometimes Sofyan. Dulmatin, according to Yudi, was in charge, handing out assignments to different members of the group as they prepared to set up the training camp. He tasked Sofyan with getting weapons and gave him the money to do so through Yudi. It was not clear where the money came from, but some of the weapons came through an old police associate of Sofyan’s named Trisno in the logistics department of Indonesian police headquarters. Trisno sold him firearms that were supposed

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49Ibid. Even though the participants were not GAM, it would have been logical for any Acehnese to see GAM as a model for setting up a military structure.

50Maulana had been detained under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act while coming back from Mindanao in late 2003; he was released in late 2008 with a group of other Indonesians and returned to Indonesia.

51President Yudhoyono referred to these posters in an emotional speech on the day of the July 2009 hotel bombings in Indonesia, not realising the training had been carried out five years earlier.

52“Wawancara Tersangka Terorisme”, Kompas, op. cit.

53Ibid.
to have been destroyed but were actually in good working order, and his prices were not cheap: an AK-47 reportedly cost about Rp.17 million ($1,700). He and two junior police officers working with him were arrested on 6 March. Sunata also let his former KOMPAK comrades in Poso and Ambon know that he was looking for leftover guns.

Plans suffered a major setback with the Noordin-led bombings of the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta on 17 July 2009 and the police operations that followed. Not only did the intensity of those operations put further preparations on hold, but the lintas tanzim group lost a key member when Urwah was killed together with Noordin outside Solo on 17 September. Contrary to assumptions at the time, Urwah had not been part of the original planning team for the bombings; his participation in the lintas tanzim group was evidence of his doubts about the efficacy of Noordin’s tactics. But he had been a part of Noordin’s inner circle and the two remained close, so when Noordin asked him for help, Urwah recruited some key participants. He was also included in the abortive July 2009 plot to kill President Yudhoyono near the latter’s residence in Cikeas, West Java, as were a few others who joined the lintas tanzim group, and he tried to help Noordin hide in September as the police dragnet closed in.

Dulmatin, Ubaid, Deny and Mustaqim used Noordin’s death to try to consolidate the group and attract Noordin’s supporters. Not long afterwards, on 6 November in Banda Aceh, the representative of the German Red Cross in Aceh, Erhard Bauer, was shot and wounded in his car by two men on a motorcycle. A spate of other, less serious attacks followed. When the police were unable to identify the perpetrators – in fact Muchtar and others from Yudi’s group – Dulmatin reportedly became convinced that the strategy of targeted assassinations was indeed safer than bombings and the designation of Aceh as a secure base was vindicated.

As the group began training, a villager collecting rattan in the forest reported the unusual activity to the local police, and a sweeping operation began.

55 Ibid.
56 Among those recruited by Urwah were Air Setyawan and Eko Joko Sarjono, both from Laweyan, Solo. A third member of the Laweyan group, Rakmat alias Tono alias Bayu Seno, was arrested on 11 April 2010 for participation in the Aceh group. Urwah also reportedly recruited one of the suicide bombers for the July hotel bombings, Nana Supriata alias Ikhwan Maulana.
57 Police announced that some of the six arrested on 11 April 2010 in Medan had been involved in the Cikeas plot but did not specify whom. “Kapoldasu: Tersangka Teroris Mengaku Terlibat Rencana Ledakan Cikeas”, Analisa, 12 April 2010.
59 Several men with Mindanao experience came on board as instructors. One was Joko Sulistyyo alias Zainuddin from Boyolali, a KOMPAK member who went to the Philippines through Abdullah Sunata. His wife, Aulia Syahidah, is the niece of Amrozi, the Bali bomber executed in 2008. He had been detained by Malaysian authorities coming back from Mindanao in 2006 but was released and returned to Indonesia in 2009. Another was Enceng Kurnia alias Arham, another friend of Sunata’s and Darul Islam member, who was also an Ambon veteran. He played a key role in helping Dulmatin escape to the Philippines in 2003. He was arrested in 2005, received a six-year sentence in 2006 and had been released since November 2008.
IV. THE BREAKUP OF THE GROUP

At the time the training camp in Jantho was discovered, the police counter-terror unit Detachment 88 had no operations in Aceh, although the provincial police command had some local men assigned to the unit. The breakup of the lintas tanzim began with an incident on 22 February 2010 in the hills around Kreung Linteung, Desa Jalin, Jantho, Aceh Besar, when a local police intelligence officer alerted to the presence of armed men encountered one while on patrol. The jihadi seized his weapon, and the officer returned for reinforcements. Later that afternoon, a paramilitary unit of the district police returned to the area and managed to arrest Yudi; Masykur Rahmat, another Acehnese from Yudi’s group; and two men from Ring Banten. In the process, they killed two civilians they mistook for terrorists, a local GAM leader named Raja Rimba and a fourteen-year-old boy. Further operations took place on 24-25 February in Lembah Seulawah, Aceh Besar, leading to three more arrests and the discovery of a video in the name of Tanzim al-Qaeda Indonesia for Serambi Makkah.

It was only after these arrests that Detachment 88 from Jakarta began to get involved, although they were already on the trail of Dulmatin in Jakarta, apparently unaware that the Aceh group was linked. Beginning on 27 February, a combined police operation with a Brimob unit from the provincial police, district units and Detachment 88 surrounded an area in Aceh Besar where they believed many of the jihadis were in hiding. By 3 March, thirteen had been arrested.

On 4 March, a clash near Lamkabeu village, Sileumum subdistrict left three police dead and eleven wounded. A civilian, Nurbari, was killed by a stray police bullet. “The terrorists knew the field better than us and they held the higher ground so they could monitor our movements and positions”, the national police spokesman told a press conference later. They were also well-armed, with M-16s and plenty of ammunition.

On 5 March, another man from Banten, Ade alias Adam, was arrested, and Sofyan was taken into custody in Jakarta the next day. Four more jihadis were captured over the next few days.

Operations then moved to Jakarta where further arrests took place in Jakarta and West Java. Then on 9 March, two raids took place in Pamulang in Tanggerang subdistrict, west of Jakarta. Police tailed Dulmatin and his wife on a motorcycle. After dropping his wife at a beauty salon, Dulmatin went to an Internet café. He had been online for about five minutes on the second floor, when police came in. According to news reports, he fired first and the police responded, killing him, although there is no independent verification of the sequence of events. In a separate raid, about a kilometre away, Dulmatin’s two bodyguards were shot and killed as they fled on a motorcycle from a private house where they were apparently living. More arrests followed.

On 12 March, in another operation in Aceh, police tracked a vehicle with a group of jihadis on board, apparently hoping to reach Medan, North Sumatra. The car was stopped, and two of the passengers were shot and killed. They turned out to be Kang Jaja, head of Ring Banten, and Enceng Kurnia, the Mindanao veteran and Darul Islam member. Eight others were arrested, including Joko Sulistoyo. One GAM member marvelled at the stupidity of supposedly well-trained jihadis putting ten important members into one car to try to escape. “We would have dispersed one by one”, he told a reporter.

On 19 March, Aman Abdurrahman was arrested at his home in Sumedang, West Java; Ustad Kamal remains at large.

Police operations continued, but the next major series of arrests took place as a result of local police vigilance. On 11 April, three police from a substation in Medan were on routine patrol when they noticed a muddy van with an Aceh number plate parked in front of a military cemetery. As they approached, those inside tried to flee. Six of the eight were captured, and they included some of the lintas tanzim leaders: Ubaid, Qomaruddin alias Mustaqim, who reportedly led the training camp in Jantho, and Deny Suramto as well as Bayu Seno from Laweyan, Solo, a friend of Urwah’s; Pandu Wicaksono Widyaputro alias Pandu, also from Solo; and Yusuf Arifin from Lampung. Ali, an Acehnese, and Usman alias Gito, from Lampung, escaped.

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60 It remains unclear what Raja Rimba was doing when he was shot. He was originally reported as having been going on a motorcycle, accompanied by friends on two other motorcycles, to fish; later there were suggestions that he was on his way to contact the jihadis in the hills.

61 The three were Boas Woisiri; Srihandri Kusumo Malau; and Dermansyah.

62 “Police officer, two civilians killed in Aceh firefight”, Jakarta Post, 6 March 2010. (The headline is misleading as only one civilian was killed.)


On 12 April, Detachment 88 police raided a house in Cot Irie village, Krueng Barona Jaya, Aceh Besar and killed a suspected member of the group. He turned out to be Enal Ta’o, 38, a Malaysian JI member of ethnic Tausug (southern Philippines) origin who had been on the police wanted list since 2005 for a series of violent crimes in Poso, central Sulawesi, including the beheading of three schoolgirls. He had apparently been living in Aceh since fleeing Poso in 2006, had married a local woman, and was working as a local driver for a Qatar-based NGO. Enal had hosted Dulmatin on his visits to Aceh and his house became a transit centre for recruits going to the Jantho training camp.

Although police continued to hunt for jihadis in Aceh and Java, there was general consensus by mid-April that the lintas tanzim project had been broken up – for now.

V. THE CURRENT STATE OF JIHADISM

With more than 70 people identified as involved in the lintas tanzim project, the “third wave” of Indonesian jihadism is temporarily smashed. But there are enough individuals left from the different groups involved for them to assess what went wrong and try again.

There are at least three strands of jihadism still active in Indonesia: supporters of qital nikayah or Noordin’s brand of bombing that concentrates solely on striking and weakening the enemy; supporters of qital tamkin, focused on building a secure base to establish Islamic law with force used as necessary against whoever stands in the way; and JI, which maintains a rhetorical focus on jihad but increasingly argues that Indonesia is not the appropriate place to fight it.

Noordin may be dead but his approach to jihad is very much alive. It is probably a minority view among Indonesian jihadists now but could be strengthened by the failure of the lintas tanzim project. If Dulmatin and Aman Abdurrahman were influenced by al-Maqdisi’s approach to jihad, Noordin was more attracted by Abu Musab al-Suri, the Spanish-Syrian who argued that the goals of jihad were best met by many small autonomous cells working independently toward the same goal. Just as Noordin virtually had to start from scratch after each operation to build a new team, the remnants of his network, or individuals with no previous attachment to him, could put together a cell for a one-off operation that could still cause significant casualties.

His basic argument, that there is no victory without bloodshed, that a few committed people can weaken a much stronger enemy, and that mujahidin should be on the attack constantly as long as Muslim lands are under siege, remains persuasive to impressionable youth if conveyed by individuals with religious credentials. The author of a tract used by Noordin’s followers makes a particular point of saying that youths should be allowed to fight, and that the majority of Taliban and Abu Sayyaf members are young people.

65 Enal Ta’o was recruited together with about ten others in Sabah in 1998 and inducted into JI by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. JI already had several members of ethnic Bugis origin who could recruit among the Indonesians in Sabah; Enal, with his Tausug background, was seen as someone who could recruit among the large Moro migrant community in Sabah. In 1999 he enrolled at a JI-linked pesantren, al-Muttaqin in Jepara, Central Java, and went to Poso around 2004. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 19 April 2010.
67 An assessment of the weaknesses of the Aceh group appears on www.arrahmah.com, titled “Refleksi Jihad Aceh 2010”. Parts one and two appeared on 7 and 8 April; a third instalment has not yet been posted.
69 “Maka, Pergilah Kamu Bersama Rabbmu!!”, op. cit. Interestingly, in references to the Philippines, the document only
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Crisis Group Asia Report N°189, 20 April 2010

This stream of jihadism also has the greatest interest in forging ties to other al-Qaeda groups, including al-Qaeda central in Pakistan. From documents in the trial of Muhammad Jibriel, arrested on suspicion of seeking foreign funds for the July 2009 hotel bombings, it is clear that Jibriel had met the late Pakistani Taliban leader Mehsud and that he was in regular communication with the media division of al-Qaeda, al-Sahab. He was also trying to send Indonesians for training in Waziristan, meeting with al-Qaeda members in Saudi Arabia, and planning to open an office in Cairo.70

The use by the lintas tanzim coalition of the al-Qaeda name does not imply direct links of the same kind, but it suggests the group thought of itself as part of a global movement.

The direction of JI’s current thinking, and its decision to focus on dakwah and education, is illustrated by the formation in early 2010 in Jakarta of Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI), devoted to religious outreach. On its website, one member wrote:

> Jihad in the Indonesian context must be tied to dakwah, not stand alone. You can learn from the bombings in Jakarta that caused Muslim deaths. Just imagine a da’i (preacher) having to support jihad in front of ordinary people. What Quranic verse or hadith can a preacher use to support you? Have we reached conditions here that are so dire that we don’t even have to take Muslim deaths into consideration? Are we in a situation where if Islamic forces don’t attack the enemy with the risk of Muslim casualties, the enemy will defeat the faithful with even worse consequences? In such conditions, shedding Muslim blood can be justified. But you must answer this question honestly: is there no way to oppose the US or the West in Indonesia other than by shedding Muslim blood? If the answer is yes, then we have reached a state of emergency. But if there are other means, for example if you become a sniper who can guarantee that your victim will fall, or use poison or hitting a car or other such methods, then we have not reached such conditions. This means you are an egotist, you are not taking into consideration how difficult it is for scholars and preachers to defend you. You are happy living with your own logic, as if you’re on another planet. You feel resentful when we don’t come to your defence. When we say this isn’t jihad by law, you become angry.71

In addition, JI leaders argue that in Indonesia today, there is no possibility of a secure base. The personnel and the strength to carry out jihad are both lacking. As a result, JI leaders, while acknowledging the need for jihad, believe it should be delayed until a critical mass can be built through dakwah. They firmly support the need for training but declined to send anyone to Aceh because of the difference in approach. In a video produced by the Dulmatin group in early March, Ubaid and Mustaqim criticise JI for sitting around and doing nothing and in effect abandoning jihad.72

Nevertheless, no one should write JI off as moribund. In late 2009, several of its senior members went as migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, apparently with the intention of building the organisation’s network there.73 Its 50-some schools suggest that it will continue to be a force to be reckoned with well into the next generation. In the end, JI may prove to have the most long-term strategy of all.

71 MDUI website, http://buletinalhikmah.wordpress.com/m-d-u-i/.
72 The video was produced by Markaz Media al-Ufuq and dated March 2010, though it must have been produced earlier. It consists of a history of attacks on Muslims in Indonesia, followed by Ubaid, Mustaqim and an Acehnese sitting in what is presumably the camp in Jantho arguing for why jihad must be carried out now, The arguments bear a striking similarity to those in the Noordin-sponsored document, “Maka, Pergilah Kamu Bersama Rabbmu!!!”, suggesting that Ubaid might have contributed to the latter. The criticisms of JI are the same, as is the singling out of Abu Rusdan for particular attack. Parts of the video appeared on YouTube; the complete version is in Crisis Group’s possession.
73 Crisis Group interview, former JI member, Jakarta, 28 March 2010.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED

Several lessons can be drawn from the lintas tanzim project and the police operations that followed. The bottom line is that the government is taking terrorism seriously, but much more needs to be done for political will to translate into effective action.

Jihadism has taken root in Indonesia. Jihadi groups do not disappear after waves of arrests; they evolve and mutate, taking on new forms. The killing of a Noordin here or a Dulmatin there does not eliminate the ideology of salafi jihadism; in fact the perceived “martyrdom” of a few leaders can give the movement new life. It is essential to understand far better how, why and among whom the ideology has taken root and spread in Indonesia. Some useful studies have been produced in this regard, based on interviews with jihadi prisoners and ex-prisoners, but much more needs to be known about the intersections between non-violent and violent movements; the influence of hardline preachers and organisations like Dewan Dakwah Islami Indonesia; and the life cycle of jihadi organisations.

Understanding the intersection with non-violent groups is particularly important. Violent movements do not exist in a vacuum, but it is simplistic and misguided to see terrorism as the inevitable outgrowth of hardline teachings. It is not the automatic by-product of intolerance, and in Indonesia, some of the most vocal critics of jihadists in Indonesia come not from the moderate mainstream but from ultra-puritan salafi scholars who see jihadists as having given a political overlay to a religious movement and therefore tainted it. If there were a direct correlation between support for full implementation of sharia and violence, there would be many more members of jihadi organisations.

The recruitment of some FPI members into the jihadi group – which is not the first instance of such cooperation – does not mean that FPI, however thuggish its behaviour, is a “gateway” to jihadism. The study of recruitment and radicalisation is still in its infancy in Indonesia, however, and more case studies are needed of how individual members of non-violent hardline groups become salafi jihadis or simply part of jihadi support network, willing to provide shelter or logistic support, even if unwilling to resort to terrorism themselves.

Intelligence on extremist groups remains weak. For all the progress that has been made in the last decade in understanding extremist networks and sharing information across the region about them, the ability to detect their activities remains weak. That Dulmatin, one of the region’s most wanted terrorists, could leave the Philippines, arrive in Indonesia and live in Jakarta for at least two years without anyone being the wiser suggests that there is still some way to go in improving basic information-gathering and analysis. Much is being done in this regard: database systems of law enforcement agencies are improving, for example, and border security has been tightened in many places. But if it is true that Dulmatin was in contact from the beginning with Urwah and Ubaid, two men who should have been under the tightest surveillance following their release in mid-2007, or that the Acehnese provincial police were aware of extremist groups in Aceh long before the raids began in late February but did not get that information to Jakarta or were otherwise unable to act on it, then there are still major gaps in the system.

The solution is not necessarily to bring many other agencies into the mix – giving a broader role to the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Nasional Intelijen) and the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) will not automatically improve analysis. In fact it could lead to increased competition and turf battles that undermine rather than improve the ability to monitor existing networks or detect the emergence of new ones. It probably makes more sense to strengthen the police units that have the best existing knowledge now or at least ensure that they continue to take the lead role. The continued presence of violent extremists in Indonesia should not be used as a rationale to give arrest and detention powers to agencies other than the police, a distinct possibility as a new bill on intelligence becomes one of the 2010 legislative priorities for the Indonesian parliament.

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74 The Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII) was founded in 1967 and has become a major vehicle for dissemination of pro-sharia and anti-Christian views. Many senior members of JI are on the executive council of DDII’s Central Java branch.

75 An example of a simplistic analysis is Ilusi Negara Islam (Illusion of an Islamic State), a book published in 2009 that lumps all Islamist movements in Indonesia together as having given a political overlay to a religious movement and therefore tainted it. If there were a direct correlation between support for full implementation of sharia or who collaborates with individuals or countries that they see as enemies of Islam.

77 Two FPI members in Pekalongan were arrested in 2005 after the second Bali bombing for helping hide Noordin.
Monitoring of prisons, prisoners and ex-prisoners needs improvement. The lintas tanzim project was made possible by regular communication between prisoners and ex-prisoners, via mobile phone and direct visits. Corrections authorities must be much stricter about enforcing existing regulations against mobile telephones in prison or find technologies for jamming that do not affect the surrounding neighbourhood. They should give serious consideration to placing restrictions on visits of released jihadis to their still-detained friends, for example banning them from bringing anything into prison and ensuring that all communication is monitored.

Work is already underway to help corrections officials identify high-risk individuals when they are detained, so that better monitoring can take place during their imprisonment and after their release. At least twelve members of the Aceh group had been previously arrested, most on terrorism charges, a few for robbery or drug dealing. Every visitor, male and female alike, to these prisoners needs to be identified and screened and checked against existing databases. Prison heads and wardens need to know what to look for, particularly in terms of printed materials or CDs and cassettes that would indicate extremist teaching.

Those high-risk individuals who are conditionally released before the formal end of their sentences should be under strict surveillance at all times. The government should allocate sufficient resources to make this possible. Penalties for recidivists involved in terrorist activity should be heavy. Many of these measures are now being put in place, but reform is necessarily a slow process and the need for better control of jihadi prisoners is urgent.

Indonesia’s much-vaunted “soft approach” toward terrorism should not be discarded. It is far more appropriate than a harsher regime, and the last thing Indonesia needs is a Singapore-style Internal Security Act that would allow for indefinite preventative detention – that in all likelihood would lead to more radicalisation, not less. But there is much that can be done within the bounds of the “soft approach” to better enforce existing laws.

Paramilitary training should be subject to strict regulation. Indonesian law seems to place no restriction on the ability of private groups to carry out paramilitary training as long as no real weapons are used. Given how frequently jihadi groups are found to have engaged in this kind of activity, it would be useful to explore how training could be regulated, in a way that distinguished between traditional martial arts activities (which should not be regulated) and military preparation. The police reportedly have suggested that amendments to the anti-terrorism law No.15/2003 include a ban on paramilitary training.

More use of non-lethal methods for capturing “active shooters”. Detachment 88 came under criticism again for killing several suspects rather than capturing them alive. The killing of Dulmatin in the enclosed space of a second storey internet cafe came in for particular questioning. Just as with the aftermath of the July 2009 hotel bombings, when Noordin Top, his Yemen-trained deputy, Syaifudin Jaelani, and several others were killed, the deaths of key figures this time meant that valuable information was lost – quite apart from whether the threat posed justified shooting to kill. Dulmatin, Ridwan alias Niko and Hasan Noor were the three people who could have explained the exact nature of jihadi links, including in terms of funding and training, between Indonesia and the Philippines and perhaps beyond. That information may now have to await the capture of Umar Patek or Hari Kuncoro, two men also rumoured to have returned from Mindanao to take part in the lintas tanzim project.

Eight men were killed out of some 50 arrested this time; nine were killed out of some 25 arrested after the July 2009 bombings. The percentage of arrests to deaths may be improving, but it still raises the question of whether more training in how to handle active shooters could reduce the ratio further. A careful assessment by one analyst in October 2009 suggests that much more can be done. It would be useful for Detachment 88 to commission an analysis by independent experts to see what non-lethal options might have been available under the circumstances, as a way of learning lessons for future operations.

A new agency by itself will not solve the problem. The creation of a new National Agency for Handling Terrorism (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), authorised in late March 2010 by a presidential directive, is designed to ensure that the government take a more comprehensive approach to terrorism. Instead of just focusing on law enforcement, the new agency will facilitate decision-making; develop a national counter-

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78 The soft approach has several components: treating detained jihadis as essentially good men gone astray rather than as evil incarnate; addressing terrorism as a law enforcement issue to be dealt with by the police, rather than a military threat to be handled as a war; speedily bringing detainees to court in public trials, sentencing them to reasonable terms and ensuring their release on completion of those terms (and often earlier); and giving cooperative prisoners perks such as air tickets for family members to visit and extra rice, or financial incentives such as school fees for their children.

terrorism strategy; analyse and evaluate the terrorism threat; coordinate prevention efforts including through countering radical ideologies; coordinate deradicalisation initiatives; coordinate the various agencies responsible for counter-terrorism activity; coordinate the response to a terrorist attack and its aftermath; coordinate with international terrorist monitoring bodies; and promote increased international cooperation on terrorism-related issues.80

All of this is potentially valuable, but the new body needs to do some serious brainstorming if it is to become more than just another bureaucratic agency with a big budget. The new regulation mandates the establishment of a group of experts to advise the agency head, and the selection of this group will be critical. To succeed, it will need to have a systematic outreach to and input from Indonesian think-tanks and universities that are producing research on radical movements. Basing policy on concrete data and case studies will help prevent the development of programs based on weak or unproven premises, such as that poverty and unemployment are important drivers of radicalisation. The experts could also usefully examine why some past initiatives, like the Team for Handling Terrorism (Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme, TPT) set up after the second Bali bombing, failed.

Ability to identify ideological shifts is also important, and the agency should have someone full-time looking at radical websites and monitoring jihadi publications to see what debates in the jihadi community can reveal about shifts in targets, tactics or strategy.

The concern now is that in addition to its coordinating role, the agency will be a vehicle for boosting the role of the military in counter-terrorism. The president could assure that concern by ensuring that the head is a civilian and by reiterating publicly, when the agency formally comes into being, that the police will continue to have the lead role in counter-terrorism operations.

Tackling corruption remains important. The lintas tanzim group illustrates yet again how corruption becomes the lubricant for terrorist activities. Dulmatin had no difficulty getting a fake local identification card and passport. Sofyan used corrupt police contacts to buy supposedly destroyed weapons. Payments to prison guards undoubtedly facilitated smuggling in mobile phones and other means of communication.

Document forgery in particular should be treated as a more serious crime than it is at present, and the forgers themselves, not just the users of fake documents, should be tracked down and prosecuted. There are whole syndicates operating in Jakarta with ties to government departments, and putting them out of business would help address more crimes than terrorism.

A string of cases involving high-level police corruption that riveted the Indonesian public in early 2010 underscores the huge task the police face in building trust. No matter how effective Detachment 88 is, the police as a whole will make little headway in convincing members of the public to report suspicious behaviour unless the institution makes a better effort than it has thus far to clean up its ranks and hold its members accountable for wrongdoing.

Existing regulations with respect to extremist media should be enforced. Indonesia is rightly proud of the freedom of expression it has enjoyed since President Soeharto’s resignation in 1998 and it should avoid at all costs banning books or restricting access to the internet. That said, the government could do more than it has to ensure that publishers of jihadi texts are paying personal and corporate taxes, perhaps through the designation of a special task force to audit their finances. With so many new detainees from different jihadi groups, the police could usefully question them about their use of internet chat rooms and social networking sites like Facebook to understand how these are used for communication, recruitment and fundraising.

NGO initiatives should be encouraged. In the end, the effort to counter jihadi activity needs to go beyond the state, and many initiatives are already under way through small foundations and individual donors. Most of these are focused on prisoners or ex-prisoners, however, and on rehabilitation rather than prevention, in part because designing strategies for prevention is so much more difficult. One need is to identify areas or communities particularly vulnerable to extremist recruitment and look at options that might steer teenagers into constructive forms of activism.

Rolling up the lintas tanzim network is no mean feat and the Indonesian police, at both local and national levels, deserve credit for their fast work. But no one should be complacent that the job is over. The problem, as Aceh shows, is that even in areas believed to be impervious to radical rhetoric, determined recruiters can find followers.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 April 2010

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80 Final draft, Presidential Regulation on the National Agency for Handling Terrorism, Article 1(3), March 2010.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF ACEH

NOTE:
Simeulue, Sabang, Lhoksусumawe, and Langsa all have district status.
Two more districts were officially established on 15 June 2007 but maps are not yet available:
1. District of Pidie Jaya, carved out of Pidie district, and
2. City of Tabulussalam, carved out of Aceh Singkil district.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED, KILLED OR WANTED

A. The Acehnese


3. Surya Achda alias Abu Semak Belukar, from Desa Sare, Seulimum, Aceh Besar, arrested 25 February 2010. Studied chemical technology at Brawijaya University, Malang, East Java in 2000. Many of his relatives were killed in the 2004 tsunami.


5. Andre alias Tengku Ahmad, from Aceh Utara, arrested 9 March 2010. Played a key role in linking the salafi study group around Abu Nur in Aceh Besar with recruits at Darul Mujahidin pesantren in North Aceh.

6. Tengku Mukhtar Ibrahim alias Furqy, from North Aceh, designated as commander of al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah for wilayah Pasee, member of FPI Aceh, surrendered 16 March 2010 in Lhoksumawe. Some newspapers reported him as a former member of GAM for the Pasee region, but Acehnese sources say he was a sympathiser, never really a member. His brother is village head of Blang Cireuem. Detained in Cipinang on minor narcotics charges before the tsunami (probably mid-2004). Reportedly responsible for attacks on foreigners in November 2009 in Banda Aceh.

7. Agam Fitriadi alias Afit alias Syamil from Aceh, arrested 17 March 2010. Graduate of Home Affairs Institute of Government in 2005, took same course as Yudi Zulfahri at Wahdah Islamiyah school in Makassar. Also member of Abu Nur’s salafi study group. Helped house members of the group at his house in Banda Aceh. His father is Lt Col Darwin Sagala, from the Indonesian army; he reportedly stole his father’s gun for the group.

8. Abu Rimba alias Munir alias Abu Uteun from Aceh, 25, turned himself in on 18 March 2010 in Aceh Besar with AK-47 and 129 bullets. Says he is ex-GAM from Gajah Keng, Aceh Besar, although local commander denies it; his brother Ilyas, however, was a locally influential GAM member. Took part in FPI training for Palestine volunteers, 2009.


10. Azwani alias Abu Mus’ab alias Maratunsi from Gempong Awee Geutah, Peusangan, Bireuen district, said to be al-Qaeda commander for Batee Iliek district. FPI recruit, trained in shooting at Brimob headquarters. Lived near Aceh Governor Irwandi. Turned himself in 23 March 2010.

11. Muhsin alias Imam Muda alias Aconk from Keudee Lampoh Saka, Sigli, kabupaten Pidie Aceh. FPI recruit, trained in shooting at Brimob headquarters. (WANTED)

12. Nukman from Banda Aceh. (WANTED)

13. Abu Rincung, from Lhoksukon, Aceh Utara. Reportedly trained in shooting at Brimob headquarters. (WANTED)


15. Alek from Parang Sekuring, Aceh Utara. (WANTED)

16. Ali, travelling with group arrested in Medan on 11 April 2010 but escaped. (WANTED)

17. Tgk. Marzuki alias Tengku, Acehnese, shot on 4 March 2010. From Alue Bu, Peureulak, East Aceh. Initially reported as former GAM member, but too young (in his 20s) to have played any major role. (KILLED)

18. Iwan Suka Abdullah, from Aceh Besar, shot on 3 March. (KILLED)

NOTES: Not yet clear if Fadli Sadama (ex-Toni Togar group, JI Medan) and Safrizal (local drug dealer, radicalised by Toni Togar et al in Tanjung Gusta Prison),
arrested in connection with fa’i bank robbery in Bireuen in May 2009, are linked to the lintas tanzim group.

B. Ring Banten

19. Kang Jaja alias Aqdam alias Pura Sudarma alias Pura Sudarmo alias Mamang, from Sajira, Banten, supervised the training; shot dead on 12 March. Kang Jaja had been involved in Australian embassy bombing, then fled to Poso where he was protected by Hasanuddin. His nephew is Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, who helped put together the group from prison, and his brother, Saptono, is now on the wanted list. Financed Mindanao training for Darul Islam recruits but never went himself. (KILLED)

20. Zaki Rachmatullah alias Zainal Muttakin alias Abu Zaid, from Pandeglang, Banten, arrested 22 February 2010. Nephew of Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois with whom he was in mobile phone contact.

21. Sapta Adi bin Robert Bakri alias Syailendra alias Abu Mujahid alias Ismet Hakiki, about 40, from Pandeglang, Banten, arrested 22 February 2010. Originally from Petamburan, West Jakarta, moved to Pandeglang and joined Ring Banten after he married a Banten woman. Trained in Mindanao, reportedly involved in 2004 Australian embassy bombing. Once worked as a security guard at Plaza Senayan mall. Protégé of detained embassy bomber Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois with whom he was in frequent mobile phone contact.


24. Saptono from Cianjur, brother of Kang Jaja, part owner of CV Sajira. Mindanao-trained. Considered by police to be one of most important men on wanted list. (WANTED)

C. The Lampung Group (organisational affiliation not clear)


29. Deni Sulaiman alias Sule, from Lampung, arrested 4 March 2010. Nephew of Utomo alias Abu Faruq, head of JI wakalah Lampung, who was arrested for taking part in special forces training, 2003.


32. Yusuf Ariffin, arrested 11 April 2010 along with others in Medan.

33. Usman alias Gito, from Lampung, recruited by Dulmatin. Fled after group he was travelling with was arrested in Medan, 11 April 2010. (WANTED)

D. The Aman Abdurrahman Group

34. Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, arrested 19 March 2010, at his home in Kampung Cipanteneun, Desa Licin, Kecamatan Cimalaka, Samedang. Previously arrested March 2004 for Cimanggis bomb-making class, sentenced to seven years, released July 2008. Graduated from Madrasah Tsanwiyah Negeri, Samedang; LIPIA (1999); worked for Rabitah Alam Islami and IIRO, 1999; imam of al-Sofwah mosque, Lenteng, South Jakarta; translates work of al-Maqdisi and other radical clerics under name Abu Sulaiman. Had a pesantren called Ibnu Masoed in Depok, either a new name for his first pesantren, Millah Ibrahim, in Pamulang, or a separate one altogether.

35. Agus Kusdianto (mistakenly written Wasdianto in the police list) alias Hasan alias Mus’ab bin Nasim, involved in the 2004 Cimanggis bomb-making class. Arrested 1 March 2010. He had been previously arrested in March 2004, tried in September 2004, sentenced to five years and released in August 2007.

36. Gema Awal Ramadhan alias Ahmad alias Abu Heidir from Medan, Tapanuli Selatan, graduate of Home Affairs Academy (STPDN) 2005, worked in the district government of Samedang, arrested 12 March 2010. He was previously arrested after the hazing death of a student in Home Affairs Institute of Government, apparently radicalised in Sukamiskin Prison after exposure to Aman Abdurrahman.

Acehnese in Brimob headquarters in shooting. Second wife was from Aceh, volunteered after the tsunami there.


40. Abu Musa, arrested in Mampang Prapatan, Jakarta, 19 March 2010. He was an assistant to Aman Abdurrahman.

41. Kamaludin bin Khasan alias Abdul Hamid from Majalengka. Arrested for the Cimanggis bomb-making class in March 2004 and sentenced to three years in prison. After sentence reduction in 2005 on appeal to the Supreme Court, would likely have been released in late 2006 or early 2007. A LIPIA student, he had been a member of Aman’s group at Yayasan al-Sofwa from 2002. In 2004 he said his ambition was to join the Taliban in Afghanistan. Helped prepare targets for operations in Banda Aceh on instructions of Abu Yusuf alias Mustaqim. (WANTED)

42. Ayub alias Abu Ishak, from Sukmajaya Depok, attended Aman’s pesantren Ponpoes Ibnu Masoed in Depok. (WANTED)

E. KOMPAK

43. Joko Sulistyio alias Zainuddin alias Ust Mahfud alias Makhruf alias Ridwan Prayoga, from Dukuh Jebol, Donohudan, Ngemplak, Boyolali, arrested 12 March 2010. His wife, Aulia Syahidah, is Amrozi’s niece. He is the brother-in-law of Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni alias Umar Besar, one of the Bali bombers. Studied English at Diponegoro University, reportedly went to Malaysia to work in 1994. Member of leadership group in Aceh, trainer in shooting, dismantling and reassembling weapons. Police say he joined Mufidah alias Abu Badrin, MILF, in Pawas, Liguasan Marsh, Mindanao, and that he was former Internal Security Act detainee in Malaysia, arrested in March 2006. According to his wife, Zainuddin was the name he used in the Philippines. Iqbal Huseini alias Reza’s testimony places Zainuddin at Pawas camp in 2003 together with Dulmatin, Umar Patek and Hari Kuncoro.


46. Abdullah Sunata, arrested in 2004 for withholding information on Noordin; received seven-year sentence, released March 2009. Involved in planning and recruitment related to Aceh training. Considered by police to be one of most important men on wanted list. (WANTED)

47. Sibgho alias Mus’ab alias Holil participated in initial discussions with Dulmatin about forming new coalition. Ran study sessions in Islamic exorcism in Pamulang. Experience in Poso and Ambon. Went with Yudi Zulfahri to Aceh in early 2009. (WANTED)

F. Darul Islam: Kelompok Akram (close to KOMPAK)

48. Ahmed Sayid Maulana, born 1974. Fought in Ambon and Poso; arrested in Sabah 2 December 2003 while returning from Mindanao, released 2008. At the time of his arrest in 2003, he was involved in planning for attacks in Jakarta on police headquarters and claimed to be representing the Federated Islamic Republic of Indonesia (Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, RPII). (WANTED)


G. Linked to Dulmatin

51. Hasan Nur alias Blackberry, shot on 9 March 2010. One of Dulmatin’s bodyguards, from Philippines, believed to be Abu Sayyaf. (KILLED)

52. Enal Ta’o, 38, Malaysian citizen, ethnic Tausug (southern Philippines origin) from Sabah, killed in police raid in Aceh Besar, 12 April 2010. Became JI in 1998, inducted directly by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; enrolled in JI pesantren al-Muttaqin, Jepara, Central Java, in 1999, went to Poso around 2004, involved in violent crimes there including 2005 beheading of three schoolgirls. Fleed to Aceh 2006, married local woman, worked as driver for Qatar-based NGO. Hosted Dulmatin during visits to Aceh. (KILLED)

53. Tongji alias ustad Warsito alias Hasbi, from Pamulang. (WANTED)

54. Ali alias Fani alias Hamzah, from Pamulang (originally from Lampung?), married Dulmatin’s wife’s younger sister. Considered by police to be one of most important men on wanted list. (WANTED)

H. The Solo Group (Ex-Noordin Associates)


59. Rahmat alias Tono alias Bayu Seno from Laweyan, Solo, arrested 11 April 2010. Close friend of Air Setiawan and Eko Peyang, killed in police raid after July 2009 hotel bombings, may also have been involved in plot.

60. Firin alias Ramon from Solo, recruited by Dulmatin. (WANTED)

I. Affiliation Unclear

61. La Ode Hafiz alias Abu Urwah, 25, from Sulawesi but lived Kalimalang, Jakarta, arrested 1 March 2010.


63. Adi Gunadi alias Badru, from Jakarta, arrested 1 March 2010 (identified as former staff of Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C) by MER-C staff).

64. Sutrisno from Jakarta, arrested 6 March 2010. Involved in helping Sofyan buy arms from police depot.

65. Tatang from Jakarta, arrested 6 March 2010. Constable accused of helping Sofyan buy arms from police depot.


67. Syaiful Siregar alias Imam from Medan, arrested 9 March 2010 in Jakarta (identified as ex MER-C volunteer by MER-C staff).


70. Taufik from Medan, arrested 12 March 2010.


73. Babe alias Abu Hamzah alias Reza, cousin of actress Shireen Sungkar, from Ciledug Jakarta. (WANTED)

74. Fadil from Jawa Tengah. (WANTED)

75. Zuhair from Jawa Tengah. (WANTED)

76. Ismail. (WANTED)

77. Anu Syam alias Syamsudin. (WANTED)

78. Ima alias Yasir alias Harun from Jakarta. (WANTED)
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